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RECAP; United States v. Jordan Linn Graham: Oral Arguments 
 
Connor Walker 
 Nos. DA 14-30062 and DA 15-30079 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Oral Argument: Tuesday, November 3, 2015 at 9:00 AM in the Pioneer 
Courthouse, Portland, Oregon. 
 
I. SUMMARY 
  At oral argument, the main issue was the appellant’s justification 
for withdrawing her guilty plea. Appellant contended that the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying the motion. She claimed the 
prosecution’s sentencing memorandum, which argued for an upward 
variance in sentence, violated the plea agreement. She further contended 
that this violation caused the trial judge to impose a sentence that she 
could not reasonably have expected to receive when making her plea, 
and therefore she had a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea. 
 
II. MICHAEL DONAHOE FOR THE PETITIONER 
   The questions came before Mr. Donahoe had finished his 
opening statement. Judges Watford and Berzon both asked if there was 
an express agreement beyond the written plea agreement, where the 
prosecution had agreed to drop the first-degree murder and obstruction 
charges.  Mr. Donahue replied that there was no explicit agreement about 
sentencing. “Then it seems to me you’re out of luck,” Judge Watford 
responded. Judge Berzon asked if Mr. Donahue was arguing that there 
was an implied agreement, and he affirmed that his argument included 
that point.  
 Judge Berzon wanted to be clear what the ‘fair and just reason’ 
was for withdrawal of the plea. She offered that if there was an implied 
agreement then he might argue the fair and just reason standard would be 
lower. Mr. Donahue responded that the trial judge considered 
voluntariness of the plea when applying the fair and just reason standard, 
and that was disallowed as a consideration by case law. The response 
went more to the judge’s standard than a clear articulation of the 
appellant’s reason for withdrawal of the plea.  
 Judge Fischer said he could understand the implicit agreement 
argument, but reiterated the question: what was the fair and just reason? 
Mr. Donahue replied that it is a question of degree, from breach on one 
end of the scale and fair and just reason on the other. The overall context 
of the plea discussion is important to understanding the reason, he said.  
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 But the quid pro quo was the withdrawal of the first-degree 
murder charge, Judge Watson countered, and appellant’s argument is that 
the United States couldn’t introduce any factors that might make the 
sentence higher. Mr. Donahue responded that the Court should look not 
only at the defendant’s benefit in the bargain but also at the disadvantage 
the prosecution was removing from their own outcome. Judge Berzon 
noted that if there had been an actual conviction for second-degree 
murder rather than a plea, the United States could have argued exactly as 
it did.   
 At the end of Mr. Donahue’s time, Judge Berzon summarized 
that in finding an abuse of discretion for a ‘fair and just reason’ the court 
would also have to find that the United States breached the plea 
agreement. 
 
III. ZENO BAUCUS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
  Mr. Baucus opened by informing the panel that he was 
personally present when the plea agreement was made and that there had 
been no agreement concerning sentencing recommendations.  
 Just as he had with the appellant, Judge Watford challenged Mr. 
Baucus right away. Watford suggested that the prosecution had violated 
the spirit if not the letter of the agreement if there were an implicit 
understanding that the sentencing recommendation would be consistent 
with second degree murder. Mr. Baucus asserted that there was no 
implicit understanding.  He said the prosecution relied on the trial court’s 
discretion at sentencing, and there was nothing in the record or the law to 
“bind the hands of the United States to argue the facts “as they saw fit.   
 On further questioning, Mr. Baucus claimed that the court had 
advised the defendant and she understood that the United States could 
argue for upward variance at sentencing. Again, Judge Watford 
challenged Mr. Baucus, asking if it wasn’t part of the benefit of the 
bargain that the United States would recommend a sentence more 
consistent with second-degree murder.  Mr. Baucus replied that the 
defendant’s benefit was to not be exposed to a mandatory life sentence. 
 The most challenging line of questioning for the United States 
came when Judge Fischer again pressed to find if there was an explicit 
understanding about this benefit at sentencing and Mr. Baucus replied 
that it was implicit.  Judge Fischer then said that the appellant had a 
different understanding of what was implicit. The judge’s statement went 
to the theory of an implicit agreement that Judge Berzon introduced 
when questioning Mr Donahoe. If the prosecution admits that they had 
an implicit understanding, while the appellant had a different implicit 
understanding, would that misunderstanding be a fair and just reason to 
withdraw the plea? Mr. Baucus, understanding the implications, replied 
that there’s no law to support that argument. If the court followed that 
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reasoning, he argued, prosecutors would be obligated to submit 
sentencing recommendations to defense counsel before they were made 
to the court. 
 Finally, Judge Berzon asked Mr. Baucus the same question she 
had asked Mr. Donahoe at the end of his time: what standard applies for 
a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea? Mr. Baucus said that it was a 
vague concept that included many factors, such as competence of 
counsel, intervening events, adequacy of the hearing, or changes in law. 
He asserted that the appellant’s position is basically a sentencing 
argument—they wanted a downward variance, and the prosecution 
argued for an upward variance. 
 
III. REBUTTAL BY MR. DONAHOE  
  Mr. Donahoe asked the court to look to United States v. Ortega-
Ascanio1, which included a ‘fair and just reason’ definition.2 Though that 
case was factually dissimilar, he conceded, the fair and just reason 
standard from that case could be applied.3 Mr. Donahoe claimed that the 
trial court did not apply the standard properly because it considered the 
voluntariness of the plea. This was an error of law, he asserted, and at a 
minimum the issue should be sent back to the trial court to apply the 
correct standard. 
 Judge Berzon again asked what the appellee’s fair and just 
reason was to withdraw the plea. Mr. Donahoe responded that the 
“parties had agreed to lay down arms.” The repeated questions on this 
point likely indicate that this will be a central issue addressed in the 
panel’s decision. 
 Judge Berzon didn’t seem to accept the Appellant’s position that 
the trial judge was unfairly biased by the prosecution’s sentencing 
memorandum. She observed that the sentence didn’t rely on 
premeditation; rather, the trial court was concerned with the defendant’s 
lies and attempts to mislead investigators. In closing, Judge Berzon 
reiterated that to find an abuse of discretion there would have to be a 




 The first question out of the gate set the tone. The judges were 
looking for an explicit breach of the plea agreement and found none. 
                                           
1 United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004).  
2 Id at 883. (The definition includes the phrase “any other reason that did not exist when the 
defendant entered the plea” and the opinion suggested that the standard “should be applied 
liberally.”) 
3 Id. (The issue in Ortega-Ascanio concerned an intervening Supreme Court decision after a pretrial 
plea entry.) 
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Judge Berzon’s observation at the end will likely control—without an 
explicit breach, there is no abuse of discretion. The court will probably 
rule against the appeal on this basis.  
 An issue presented in the appeals briefs but never reached in the 
oral arguments was a motion to amend the record to include the draft 
jury instructions.4 This motion is likely moot. By making that motion the 
defense already put the draft instructions before the eyes of the appeals 
court. It is doubtful that this issue will have any independent impact 
since it is merely a supporting element in the defense’s argument that the 
United States breached the plea agreement. 
 Judge Berzon seemed interested in the secondary argument that 
an implied breach occurred, which was an adequate foundation for a fair 
and just reason to withdraw the plea. It would be an original finding if 
the Ninth Circuit were to decide on this basis. However, Mr. Baucus’ 
concerns about such a finding have merit because it would be a heavy 
burden on the court system to adjudicate implied agreements without 
additional evidence.  It is unlikely the court will open this can of worms.  
 The final opinion will likely consider the fair and just reason 
standard. The judges repeatedly asked for a definition of the fair and just 
reason standard, and neither counsel could respond to the panel’s 
satisfaction.  Appellant’s argument at rebuttal that the trial court 
improperly considered voluntariness deserves some consideration. 
Expect a definitive answer. 
                                           
4 Our Precap gives fuller treatment to the defense’s motion, and can be read at 
http://www.montanalawreview.org/precap-united-states-v-jordan-linn-graham-can-we-try-this-
again.html 
